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abstract While the Chilean pension reform has received
considerable attention, its emulation in Nigeria has not. This article
is the first in-depth analysis of the Nigerian reform. It suggests that
the Nigerian authorities failed to learn the lessons of Chile. They
transposed a system that both failed to serve the country from which
it was copied and that is inappropriate to the country to which it was
copied. For countries such as Nigeria, alternative forms of provision
for old age are needed. A social pension might be considered.
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The issues of policy learning and policy transfer have attracted considerable academic
attention in the last decade. Social scientists have been interested in whether learn-
ing is possible, how people learn and under what circumstances policy transfer is pos-
sible, what the role of international institutions and policy entrepreneurs has been,
and at which speed policies are diffused (Weyland, 2005). At the European level, pol-
icy learning and transfer has received a quasi-official status. The European
Commission has developed the Open Method of Coordination, which promotes the
exchange of information, the publication of good practice, the comparison of per-
formance against benchmarks, and relies on peer pressure as a means of initiating
change and reform (Casey and Gold, 2005; Dostal, 2004; Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005).
Although the literature on policy learning covers many subjects, much of the
recent interest in policy learning has been directed towards social policy in the
wider sense. With respect to policy learning and pensions, a persistent interest
has been with the Chilean reform of 1981, with the way in which it became an
example that other countries have emulated, and with the role the World Bank
has had in propagating it as a ‘model’. Many studies have looked at the way in
which other Latin American countries set up ‘Chilean-like’ systems (Weyland,
2004). Some have considered the way such a system was transplanted to the
newly independent countries of central and eastern Europe (Müller, 1999).
Others have commented that advocating pension reforms involving the intro-
duction of Chilean-like systems into the advanced industrialized economies
amounted to encouraging ‘technology transfer in reverse’ (Casey, 2005).
With one exception – a mainly descriptive paper produced by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005a) – none of the studies have dealt
with the case of the Nigerian pension reform. Yet the new pension system
introduced in Nigeria in 2004 was the product of a deliberate attempt at trans-
fer – a transfer both of broad principles of policy and of administrative and
delivery structures. Nigerian policy makers were of the view that, if they could
initiate such a reform, it would produce the same benefits for their country as
they saw it having produced for Chile.
This article is divided into four sections. The first section looks at the pol-
icy learning and transfer processes as they apply to the Nigerian pension
reform. The second section examines the reasons why reform was seen as
essential, the way in which it was carried out, and the manner of operation of
the new system. The third section assesses the newly reformed pension sys-
tem in terms of its operating costs and its contribution to the economic devel-
opment of Nigeria. In all three sections, comparisons with Chile are made.
The last section discusses issues of governance and suggests that a social pen-
sion rather than a private, funded pension system might provide the way for-
ward for old age security in Nigeria.
Policy Learning and the Nigerian Pension Reform
It might seem unlikely that Nigeria would look to Chile when seeking a model.
Nigeria is not contiguous with (or even in the same continent as) Chile.
Neither, as Table 1 shows, could it be perceived similar in terms of economic
or social development – even if the comparison is of Nigeria at the end of the
20th century with Chile some three decades earlier. The only similarity is that,
when the Nigerian pension reform was initially conceived, the country, like
Chile in 1981, was ruled by a military dictatorship. It might be possible to
argue that this gave Chile a ‘high status’ in the eyes of the then policy makers.1
However, by the time the Nigerian government was giving serious atten-
tion to pension reform, the Chilean model was being criticized. The World
Bank had come to recognize that Chilean-like reforms had not always deliv-
ered the benefits that had initially been proclaimed, that too many assump-
tions had been made, and that other reforms were also required – reforms that
at best complemented, or even preceded pension reform (Gill et al., 2005;
Holzmann and Hinz, 2005; World Bank, 2005).2 Equally, in Chile, dissatis-
faction with the existing system, in terms of its costs and its failure to make
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adequate provision for many of the old, had been a persistent theme of the
2005–6 presidential elections. In 2006, the new administration announced
wide-ranging changes to pension provision, placing greater emphasis both on
solidarity and tax financing and on tighter controls on the operations of pen-
sion providers (Gobierno de Chile, 2006). In this respect, Nigeria seems to be
at the very end of the ‘ogive- or S-shaped’ path of policy dispersion
(Orenstein, 2003) – the pension reform was made at a time when initial enthu-
siasm was well past and disenchantment had set in.
The Nigerian pension reform project was initiated as early as 1996. It was
an element of the Vision 2010 project under which the then military gov-
ernment charged a team to chart the goals to be reached by the time Nigeria
reached the 50th anniversary of its independence (Pension Subcommittee,
1997). One of the objectives was that ‘by the year 2010 most Nigerians shall
have access to some form of social protection offered by the formal Social
Security Program’ (Pension Subcommittee, 1997: 45). Those examining
pension provision made an inventory of other countries’ systems. In their
end report, they presented the pension systems of: Ghana, a neighbour; the
UK, the former colonial power; the United States, a dominant world power;
and Chile (Pension Subcommittee, 1997). When proposing the way for-
ward, they were emphatic that a Chilean-type system provided the solution.
They argued (Pension Subcommittee, 1997: 47–8) that pensions were
‘instruments for the promotion of economic growth and development’ and
continued:
Countries that have set the right policies and undertake the appropriate reforms,
such as Chile, have reaped very bountiful economic benefits, even beyond the
dreams of the initiators. Chile, with near hero GDS/GDP ratio [savings rate] and
very low per capita income in the early 80s, is today a completely transformed econ-
omy and the envy of other South American countries. Chile’s rapid economic
growth was mostly financed by long-term savings primarily from pension funds;
channelled to the real sector through the capital market. Nigeria can perform the
same feat if not better. (Pension Subcommittee, 1997: 47)
Indeed, they were sufficiently bold as to suggest that:
Chile’s economic circumstances in the 1980’s were almost similar to Nigeria’s
today: low GDP per capita, low savings, high unemployment, high inflation, etc.
Nigeria desires a quantum leap in her economic output just as Chile in the early
1980s. If the reformed pension system facilitated Chile’s economic renaissance,
adapting Nigeria’s system to some of the good attributes is only natural and sensi-
ble. (Pension Subcommittee, 1997: 48)
The publication of the report was not immediately followed by action. This
came only after the military regime gave up power and, following elections in
1999, a civilian government took office. The new government formulated its
own programme for economic and political renewal, NEEDS (National
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Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy), although it acknowl-
edged that ‘core values [of that strategy] draw on the Vision 2010 report’
(Government of Nigeria, 2004). NEEDS emphasized macro-economic sta-
bility and put poverty reduction at the forefront. It also pledged a reform of
public services, an intensified fight against corruption and an increasing role
for the private sector. However, it was not until 2003 that attention was turned
to pension reform. At this point, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
became involved.
The Role of International Organizations
The IFIs played only a limited part in the reform of the Nigerian pension
system. Those drawing up the Vision 2010 report referred neither to the
World Bank’s seminal Averting the Old Age Crisis publication, nor to any sub-
sequent Bank studies. Equally, although the IMF was aware of the Vision
2010 exercise, and made reference to it on two occasions, it made no men-
tion of its proposals for pension reform.3 Neither did any contemporary
World Bank reports.
The IMF, and not the Bank, seems to have been the first of the IFIs to
engage with the Nigerian government on pension reform. The IMF’s involve-
ment was initiated by the government and took the form of a request for
advice. That request was acted upon with alacrity – an IMF team visited the
country in September 2003. The team included experts from the Bank. At
least two reports were produced. Although these remain ‘unpublished and
confidential’, they contained assessments of the transition costs for a scheme
very similar to that finally legislated for and compared the replacement rates
pre- and post-reform (IMF, 2005a).
In late 2003, the Bank started to prepare a technical assistance programme
for Nigeria. Although this was designed to improve economic reform and
governance in general, it did contain a component that was relevant to pen-
sions. Of the US$180m made available, some 7%, or US$6.7m, was intended
to support the pension reform by providing consultancy and computer sys-
tems (World Bank, 2004). The IMF initiated a Policy Support Instrument
(PSI) with Nigeria that involved the Fund offering help in assessing the
progress of NEEDS and (as appropriate) endorsing progress made, but it
offered no financial assistance. Elements of the pension reform programme
were included in the PSI agreement (IMF, 2006).
The manner by which the Bank became involved might, in part, be attrib-
uted to personalities. A Nigerian economist, who held a senior position at the
Bank, was recalled from Washington as an advisor to the president as early as
2000 and appointed minister of finance shortly after the 2003 election.
Although she had had no direct involvement with Latin America or with pen-
sions, the Chilean model cannot have been unfamiliar to her. Moreover,
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Nigeria had long been a beneficiary of Bank assistance and the conclusion of
the loan agreement could be seen as recognition of acceptable progress.
There are no indications that Bank assistance was made conditional upon a
particular kind of pension reform. Indeed, the Bank has claimed it advised
against the establishment of a ‘multi-pillar’ system in Nigeria on the grounds
that the financial sector there was insufficiently developed (World Bank,
2005).4 As far as the Nigerian government was concerned, taking steps to
reform pensions was seen as a way of improving the country’s credibility.
Pensions were a component of public expenditure, and one over which little
control had been exercised in the past. Thus, reforming pensions was seen as
consistent with efforts to improve fiscal policy making as a whole. The inabil-
ity of the government to produce satisfactory information on pensioner num-
bers or pension liabilities made improvements in data an item of the reform
upon which both the Bank and the IMF concentrated – the Bank via its loan
to improve economic governance and the Fund via the PSI. The IMF was also
concerned that many pensions, although promised, were either totally unpaid
or only partly paid. If these pension liabilities were recognized, the size of the
public debt might be considerably larger than that recorded in the published
accounts (IMF, 2005a).
The other international body that became involved in the pension reform
was the International Labour Organisation (ILO) – through its social protec-
tion division. Like the Bank and the Fund, the ILO commented upon the
lacunae of data recording systems. The ILO was drawn in relatively late – in
response to a request from the Nigerian pension authority to assist it in cal-
culating the entitlements of those who would not transfer to the new system.5
Although the ILO did not favour Chilean-style pension systems, it saw itself
as having a more general obligation to ensure that people affected by reform
did not lose the rights that they had acquired (ILO, 2006).
The New Nigerian Pension System
The Nigerian reform was radical. It involved a new basis for determining pen-
sions and new delivery structures. In this section, the factors that motivated
the reform are examined in more detail. Thereafter, the manner of operation
of the new system is described. Last, the structures by which it is regulated are
presented.
THE REASONS FOR REFORM
There were some similarities between the pre-reform pension systems of
Chile and Nigeria. The most notable of these was the way in which each sys-
tem was rather fragmented. By 1980, there were some 32 different pension
schemes in Chile and under these nearly 100 different plans. Although three
schemes accounted for the majority of contributing members – blue-collar
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and white-collar workers and public sector employees – these were not 
uniform in their conditions. The scheme for public sector workers was the
most favourable in terms of retirement age and benefit calculation formula
(SAFP, 2003). There were special schemes for specific occupational groups –
of which the most important, quantitatively, was the scheme for the military
– and the privileges available under these schemes were substantial.
In Nigeria, too, there were many pension schemes (Pension Subcommittee,
1997; see also IMF, 2005a). Most were much newer than those of Chile. It was
not until after independence, in 1960, that the first national scheme was intro-
duced in Nigeria. It was developed out of the provident fund scheme that had
operated for the colonial civil service and, like it, took the form of a severance
payment scheme, paying a lump sum on retirement. It was not until 1994 that
a National Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) that paid out an annuity was
established.
The NSITF covered only private sector workers. It was overshadowed by
the various schemes for public sector employees. There were special schemes
for federal public servants, for the (federal) police and security services and for
the military. At the same time, each of the 36 federal states, plus the capital
territory, had its own pension system for its public employees, as did each of
the 774 local government authorities. In addition, each of a multitude of pub-
licly owned (federal or state) enterprises (often referred to as ‘para-statals’)
had its own pension scheme.
The retirement age was normally 65, but federal civil servants could retire
on a full pension after 35 years’ service, as could military personnel after 10
years. The maximum pension under the NSITF scheme was fixed at 65% of
last salary, but for federal civil servants it was 80%. Last, pensions for federal
civil servants were supposedly adjusted in line with civil service salaries. By
contrast, there was no provision for indexing in the legislation covering the
NSITF scheme.
A yet more important difference between the various Nigerian schemes was
their financing. The pension schemes for federal, state and local civil servants
were non-contributory and unfunded. The NSITF scheme operated on a
PAYGO basis, being financed by employee and employer contributions. The
pension schemes for para-statals were non-contributory but, at least nomi-
nally, funded.
Private sector firms could establish their own occupational schemes, and
these provided both pension and severance payments. Some were contribu-
tory, some not. Some were funded, some not. How widespread these occupa-
tional schemes were is unclear. Many were small. Those that were funded, and
thus eligible for tax privileges, covered only a few thousand employees
(Pension Subcommittee, 1997).
By the mid 1970s, nearly 80% of the Chilean workforce was covered by one
or other of the statutory pension schemes. Even by the end of the decade, the
coverage rate was some 68% (SAFP, 2003). In contrast, the coverage rate of the
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Nigerian system was scarcely 8%. In Chile, it was only the self-employed –
perhaps a quarter of the workforce – who were not liable to contribute. In
Nigeria, some 90% of those who work are in the informal labour market.
Moreover, of private sector workers, only those in establishments with at least
five employees were obligatorily insured. In an economy of micro-enterprises,
these workers made up a tiny fraction of the total. As Table 2 shows, the major-
ity of covered workers were public servants and employees of para-statals.
Not surprisingly, pension expenditure for retired public sector workers
dwarfed expenditure for retired private sector workers – in 2004 federal gov-
ernment expenditure on pensions for federal civil servants, the police and the
military were the equivalent of nearly 0.9% of GDP, while benefits paid out
by the (admittedly immature) NSITF system were the equivalent of under
0.01 per cent of GDP.6
Both the Chilean and the Nigerian system were regarded as over-costly.
The Chilean system, which was absorbing some 3% of GDP in 1980, was
forecast to be costing 20% of GDP by 2000 – the result both of demographic
developments and of improvements to entitlement that had been legislated
(SAFP, 2003). The Nigerian system was seen as vulnerable not because of
adverse demography but because of its generosity. Reference was usually
made to the schemes for federal employees, to the opportunities these offered
to take some form of benefit after a very short period, and to the low mini-
mum age of entitlement to a pension. It was less frequently made to the
schemes for state and local government employees, but the IFIs frequently
commented upon the fiscal deficits run by lower level administrations and
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TABLE 2 Coverage of pension schemes in Nigeria
As % share of As % share of
total formal
000s workforce employment
Total workforcea 48,000 100.0
All in formal employmenta 4,800 10.0 100.0
Federal civil servantsb 160 0.3 3.3
State government employeesc 800 1.7 16.7
Local government authority employeesc 500 1.0 10.4
Policed 160 0.3 3.3
Other federal security employeese 82 0.2 1.7
Militarye 80 0.2 1.7
Para-statal employeesf 1,300 2.7 27.1
All public sector employees 3,082 6.4 64.2
Contributors to NSITFg 630 1.3 13.1
All in a pension scheme 3,712 7.7 77.3
Notes: a Nigerian Bureau of Statistics; b http://allafrica.com/stories/200607270298.html; c Barkan
et al, 2002; d http://www.cleen.org/policing.%20driver%20of%20change.pdf; e http://www.
nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Nigeria-ARMED-FORCES.html; f Nigerian Bureau of Public
Enterprise; g ILO (2006).
upon the need to take control of government expenditure here. The pension
reform was seen as helping to put the system on a ‘fiscally sustainable footing’
(IMF, 2005c: 66).
Both the Chilean and the Nigerian systems were regarded as inefficient and
inequitable. Criticism of the Chilean system concerned the high contribution
rates that discouraged employers from hiring labour and both employers and
workers from making proper declarations of earnings. The differences in
retirement ages for different categories of worker, and the way in which link-
ing benefits to final earnings disadvantaged those with interrupted careers and
those doing manual work, were pointed to (SAFP, 2003).
In the case of Nigeria, the privileges of civil servants were mentioned – the
reform was also intended to make the system ‘equitable’ (IMF, 2005c: 66). On
top of this, the various parts of the system were seen as inefficient. The occu-
pational pension schemes run by the para-statals were largely unregulated and
unsupervised (Milliman, 2002). The NSITF had no proper information tech-
nology and many records were merely on paper (IMF, 2005a; Pension
Subcommittee, 1997). Administrative costs were high – consuming over a
quarter of total income in 2004 and over three quarters at the start of the cen-
tury.7 There were allegations that the pension records of some parts of the civil
service, the military and the para-statals were ‘padded’ with ‘ghost pensioners’,
but it was also recognized that pensions for former federal and state employ-
ees often went unpaid (see many reports at http://www.globalaging.org).
Estimates for the extent of arrears to former federal employees (including
those from the military and from federal para-statals) have been put in the
order of 2–3% of GDP, while arrears for state and local government pension-
ers cannot even be quantified (IMF, 2005a).
THE POLITICS OF REFORM
Soon after re-election in 2003, the president set up a Pension Reform
Committee. Membership of that committee remains unclear – it is often
referred to by the name of its chairman, i.e. as the ‘Adeola Committee’. It did
not start its work from scratch but rather built on the proposals of the Vision
2010 committee. Its chairman had been a member of that committee,
although not of its pension subcommittee, and his committee drew very
closely from the pension subcommittee’s findings and recommendations.
The Adeola Committee considered not so much basic principles but rather the
details associated with establishing a Chilean-style system and with drawing up
the appropriate legislation. Legal drafts were circulated for discussion with inter-
ested and affected parties, in particular representatives of business – the Nigerian
Employers’ Consultative Organisation (NECA) – and labour – the Nigerian
Labour Congress (NLC), the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and Confederation
of Free Trade Unions (CFTU). This did not prevent the NECA from com-
plaining of being excluded from critical discussions. Initially, both business and
labour argued that pension reform should focus on addressing existing pension
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arrears in the public sector. Both were concerned about the future of the tri-par-
tite NSITF – both enjoyed an entrenched position in its administration. The
NSITF collected contributions from employers and employees in the formal
private sector and had built up a reserve. There were fears that one purpose of
the reform might be to acquire these assets and to use them to solve the pension
crisis in the public sector (Oshinowo, 2003).8
The demands of business and labour were, in part, satisfied by allowing the
NSITF to establish a Pension Fund Administrator (PFA), an option that had
featured in the 1997 report of the Vision 2010 committee. Co-owned by the
NSITF, the NLC, the TUC, the NECA and three financial service compa-
nies, that PFA – ‘Trustfund’ – has equal representation of business and labour
on its governing board.9 This did not prevent business from continuing criti-
cism of the reform, although its opposition became more muted. Business and
labour were also given one seat each on the Pension Commission (PenCom),
the body that was to regulate the new system.10 Subsequently, both business
and organized labour stood behind the new system and, through their partic-
ipation in Trustfund, actively promoted it.
The Pension Reform Act of 2004 concerned only federal-level schemes. The
remit of the federal government with respect to pension policy did not cover the
36 federal states, the local government authorities below them, or the para-
statals that these states might have established. The most the government could
do was to exhort lower level governments to emulate the reform. PenCom duly
drafted a law that each state could apply. It took two years before all agreed to
enact the necessary legislation (Komolafe, 2006). As of spring 2007, six states
had completed the process and sixteen were in the final stages of doing so.11
HOW THE NEW PENSION SYSTEM WORKS
Apart from its coverage, the new Nigerian system imitates the Chilean system
closely. The similarities can be seen in Table 3.
Transfer to the new system is obligatory. Contribution rates for employees
will actually be increased. Civil servants moved from paying no contribution
at all to paying 7.5% of salary and private sector workers saw their contribu-
tion rate rise from 3.5% to 7.5%. There is no legal requirement for any com-
pensation to be made to employees for the fall in take-home pay. The
contribution rate for private sector employers also rose – from 6.0% to 7.5%.
For federal employers, pension costs were made more explicit, since these
have to pay the 7.5% employer contribution.12
Comparing benefits between old and new systems is fraught and depends
upon a myriad of assumptions. At the time of the Chilean reform, it was
argued that the new system would offer benefits as favourable as its predeces-
sor – some 80% of last earnings. Later estimates, using ‘more realistic’ rates
of return and expected persistence of contribution, suggest a replacement rate
of about 40%, with somewhat more for men and somewhat less for women
(IMF, 2005b; Mesa-Lago, 1994).
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TABLE 3 Comparison of Chilean and Nigerian mandatory pension systems
Chile Nigeria
Public PAYGO Closed Closed
Covered workers All employees, including All federal civil servants,
agricultural workers and military, police, private
domestic workers sector employees in
enterprises with 5 or more
employees
Non-covered workers Self-employed (unless State and local government
choosing), family workers, employees, self-employed
the military and employees in
enterprises with fewer than
5 employees (unless
choosing)
For new/for existing Mandatory/initially Mandatory/mandatory
employees voluntary (unless within 3 years of
retirement)
Contribution (pension 10%, employee only Private sector and federal
only) government – 7.5%
employee, 7.5% employer;
military – 2.5 employee,
12.5% employer
Payout Annuity, deferred annuity Annuity, deferred annuity
and drawdown, scheduled and drawdown, scheduled
drawdown drawdown
Minimum pension Yes, but set on ad hoc basis Under old system 80% of
at about 75% of minimum minimum wage, under
wage, subject to min. 240 new system, yes but not
months contributions specified
Disability pension Excluded, requirement to Early pension permitted but
take out a separate no enhancement of benefits
insurance with pension
fund
Survivors benefit Covered by supplementary Employer required to take
disability insurance out life insurance for the
employee
Mandatory investment Relative to average Separate targets per asset
targets category (e.g. for
government bonds,
weighted average of 2 year
bond rate; for equities,
Nigeria all shares index)
Asset allocation rules or Asset allocation rules Asset allocation rules
‘prudent man’
(Continued)
The proponents of the Nigerian reform were not explicit about what the
scheme would offer, describing it only as providing a ‘stable, predictable and
adequate source of retirement income’ (PenCom, 2004). Simulations carried
out by the World Bank and the IMF suggest that the replacement rate for a
person with a full career will be in the order of 40% of final wage or salary –
to be compared to the maximum of 80% awarded under the federal civil ser-
vants scheme and of 65% under the NSITF scheme. Although this suggests a
substantial cut in benefits, the IMF argued that the new system, unlike the
old, ensures pensions will actually be paid, so that effective replacement rates
might not be so different (IMF, 2005a). On the other hand, it also conceded
that, to the extent that arrears were paid, this argument would be weaker.
With respect to the fashion in which benefits are taken upon retirement –
an annuity but with opportunities to take a lump sum and to make pro-
grammed withdrawals – the Nigerian scheme mimics the Chilean one almost
exactly. Like the Chilean scheme, it also provides for a minimum pension.
However, nothing is said about the level of this pension or how it is financed.
If the minimum is the same level as under the NSITF system (80% of the
minimum wage), it is not high.
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table 3 (Continued)
Chile Nigeria
Contribution collection Decentralised (by pension Decentralized (by pension
funds) funds)
Past contributions Covered via recognition Public sector unfunded
bonds (redeemed at point schemes – covered via
of retirement) recognition bonds
(redeemed at point of
retirement) financed by
transfer of 5% of wages
into special redemption
account at CBN; private
sector (in old PAYGO) –
accrued values to be
calculated and credited to
new individual accounts
Charges Average 1.61% of wages on Maximum 3% of assets
top of contributiona under management (plus
(effectively making trivial Niara 100 per month
average contribution rate as contribution) [approx.
c.11.6%) [approx. equal to equal to making total
charge of 1.2% of assets contribution rate c.19.5%
under management over over 20 years]
20 years]
Transfers between funds Max. twice per year Max. once per year
Note: a Excludes mandatory disability insurance contribution.
One of the few differences between the two systems is the treatment of 
disability and of survivors. The Chilean system keeps disability benefits out-
side the old age pension system. Disability insurance is mandatory, but an
additional contribution – some 1.5% of insurable wages – is required. The
new Nigerian scheme follows on from the NSITF scheme in offering an early
pension to those deemed ‘no longer mentally or physically capable’ of carry-
ing out their current job or are obliged to retire due to ‘total or permanent
disability either of mind or body’. However, there is no suggestion as to the
pension being enhanced or topped up in any way to take account of lost years.
The supplementary disability insurance under the Chilean system also pro-
vides benefits to survivors. Under the NSITF, survivor benefits were avail-
able, but under the new system these are provided by life insurance policies
that employers are required to take out for their employees.13 The policy is
taken out by the employer, who is obliged to cover the premium in addition
to the contribution made for a pension.
In order to deal with accrued entitlements, the Nigerian reform copied the
Chilean reform by granting recognition bonds – in the Nigerian case, these
are called ‘Federal Government Retirement Bonds’. These bonds cover only
the pensions of federal civil servants and other federal employees. Under the
Chilean reform, a recognition bond was made out in the name of each con-
tributor and placed in his or her individual account, the value being calculated
as an amount sufficient to pay that fraction of the full pension that had been
earned by service and wage to date. Under the Nigerian reform, arrangements
are less clear. Bonds are to be issued to individuals, but no value has yet been
set beyond the requirement that ‘the right to retirement benefits … be recog-
nised’ (Pension Reform Act, 2004: para. 12.1).
The obligation behind the recognition bonds is supposedly met by each
federal ministry or authority transferring the equivalent of 5% of its wage bill
to a special central government account. However, there is no explanation of
the adequacy of that sum, since no actuarial appraisal of the old systems was
carried out. Arrangements for private sector employees are even less trans-
parent. All contributions made in the employee’s name to the NSITF are sup-
posed to be calculated and, other than those necessary to administer and pay
minimum pensions, be credited to a retirement savings account held by
Trustfund.14 The government seems to have given itself some space of time to
resolve the question of what transfer values will be, since the assets held in this
account cannot be transferred to another PFA for five years.15
The absence of clarity is a cause for some concern. In Chile, calculating
transfer values was not without problems. Assessment was made on the basis
of wages in the period two years prior to the reform. In Nigeria, where record
keeping is acknowledged as a problem and inflation is high, it is uncertain
what value the Retirement Bonds will have or how much of the real value of
accruals will be transferred. Moreover, the opportunities for favouritism and
discrimination are potentially rife.
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THE REGULATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM
The importance of institutional capacity and effective regulation for the suc-
cessful operation of a system based on individual accounts is widely acknowl-
edged. Effective banks and life assurors – the providers and custodians – and
a transparent and well-functioning equities and securities market – for the
investment of assets – are required. So, too, is a dedicated regulator of the
pension system and a dedicated regulator of financial services and financial
markets. Clear accounting standards and reliable measures of creditworthi-
ness are also needed.
An appropriate infrastructure was built up gradually in Chile. Some ele-
ments pre-dated the 1981 pension reform, some were created simultaneously
and others later (SAFP, 2003). By the time the pension reform was made in
Nigeria, a considerable number of the necessary elements were in place, but
not all were functioning satisfactorily. The World Bank economic governance
project sought to improve the capacity of the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) – the body set up to fight corruption – and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), to assist in the greater use of International
Accounting Standards and to strengthen the Nigerian Standards Accounting
Board. The appropriations for these objectives (US$6.6m) were almost as
great as those made to assist the pension reform (World Bank, 2004).
Not surprisingly, there is a high degree of similarity in the pension gover-
nance systems of Nigeria and Chile. The Nigerian Pension Commission
(PenCom) closely mirrors the Chilean Pensions Superintendency. These over-
seeing bodies are responsible for approving pension fund administrators (PFAs)
and pension fund custodians (PFCs). In both countries administrative and cus-
todian roles are separated.16 One of the Nigerian PFAs – Trustfund – differs
from any other (including those in Chile) in being overseen by a board on which
sit representatives not only of government but also of labour unions and busi-
ness – something out of which it makes a virtue in its publicity material.17
PenCom, like the Superintendency, is responsible for setting rules governing
investment portfolios. When the Chilean pension reform took effect, the domes-
tic credit rating infrastructure was relatively underdeveloped. Determination of
whether assets were of investment grade was the task of a Risk-Rating
Commission, consisting of the Superintendency and representatives of financial
institutions. Local credit rating agencies grew up later. In Nigeria, an indigenous
rating agency had existed since 1992, but a second came into existence only
recently. Its founding appears not unrelated to the requirement that, as is now
the case in Chile, the issuer of any security in which pension assets are invested
must have been rated by at least two agencies.
In the early years, the Chilean pension funds were forbidden to invest in
equities or to invest abroad. It was only after some years that rules on equity
investment were relaxed and only in 1991 that investment abroad was per-
mitted. At present, Nigerian PFAs are forbidden to invest abroad and tight
limits are placed on the extent they can invest in equities. On the other hand,
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investment in federal government securities is encouraged – these are auto-
matically deemed as being of investment grade.18 Investment rules are shown
in Table 4.
The 2004 Pension Reform Act and the guidelines issued by PenCom
demand a high level of professional knowledge by PFA and PFC personnel and
lay down severe penalties for professional misconduct. On the other hand, they
ignore one of the recommendations on pension fund asset management made
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD,
2006) – that a PFA should provide a written statement about its investment
strategies. This means that potential contributors have no opportunity to eval-
uate differences in investment strategies when making their choice of provider.
None of the 13 PFAs initially operating provided such details, save the sole
PFA offering three plans and distinguishing them as ‘equity biased’, ‘balanced’
and ‘fixed income’.
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TABLE 4 Nigerian investment rule restrictions
Maximum
within
Asset type Details portfolio (%) Minimum rating
Federally issued No limit 100 None (but
instruments currently rated
BB by S&P and
BB – by Fitch)
Instruments issued Max. 2% of assets of any 20 None (none
by a federal state one state and not more currently rated)
than 2% of any one issue
Corporate bonds, Max. 2.5% of all issues of 30 BBB
REITs, mortgage- any corporate entity and
and asset- backed not more than 2.5% of
securities and debt any one issue
instruments
Certificates of deposit Max. 1% with respect to 25 A
and bankers’ any one bank
acceptances (money
market instruments)
Ordinary shares Max. 1% in any one 25 BBB (but 
company and not more AAA if IPO)
than 1% of that company’s
value
Open and closed funds Max. 0.5% in any one 5 A
fund and not more than
0.5% of that company’s
value
Foreign investments Guidelines still to be issued
Assessing the Nigerian Reform
Nigeria’s reformers claimed that the reform would bring major benefits.
Because it is so new, it is not possible to compare outcomes with aspirations.
Nevertheless, there are some lessons that can be drawn from the experience
of Chile, and these provide a basis for making an assessment of the Nigerian
reform. This section considers both micro and macro issues – the costs asso-
ciated with running such a pension system and the benefits such a system
might have for the wider economy.
THE COSTS OF THE NEW SYSTEM
The ‘Achilles heel’ of pensions systems built around private, individual accounts
has always been their administrative costs – the costs of collection of contribu-
tions, of management of accounts and of assets and the costs of ‘annuitization’.
Relative to public, PAYGO systems, systems of individual accounts lack
economies of scale. A recent comparison of pension costs in the UK suggested
that, while the overall costs of running the public pension system accounted for
about 0.1% of contribution income, the costs of running a system based upon
private accounts accounted for between 1–1.5%. This was sufficient to reduce
the amount saved by up to 30% (Pensions Commission, 2005).
Many of the criticisms of the Chilean system have centred upon the costs
that this implied. Under it, charges are levied as a supplement to contributions.
There is no attempt to regulate the level of the charge – it was presumed that
competition between PFAs would keep these down. This failed to happen. A
considerable number of funds – 12 – were established initially, but rather than
a competitive market of providers, an oligopoly, characterized by a lack of
transparency with respect to essential details, prevailed (World Bank, 2005).
PFAs competed with one another not on cost but on ‘service’. However,
service meant superficial attractiveness. Plans were marketed, and an army of
salespeople, rewarded on a commission basis, was recruited. In the early years,
there were as many as 80,000, the equivalent of 2% of the labour force (Mesa-
Lago, 1989). Commission-based salespeople offered gifts to those signing up,
and sought to win over members of rival plans. Winning the latter over was
made easier since there were no restrictions on the number of switches per-
mitted. There was no correlation between charges and number of affiliates, or
between charges and nominal returns (Mesa-Lago, 1994; World Bank, 2005).
To the cost of selling, which was a ‘recurrent’ cost, had to be added the enor-
mous set-up costs that the individual pension providers had to bear. Moreover,
the situation scarcely improved over time. At one time – 1994 – there were as
many as 21 providers in the market, although, since then, consolidation has
reduced the number down to six, of which the largest two account for two thirds
of contributors and well over half of assets under management (Arenas de Mesa
and Mesa-Lago, 2006; SAFP, 2003). The average level of charges actually rose
over time before falling again to initial levels (World Bank, 2005). This was, to
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some extent, a consequence of government intervention. The Superintendency
required that administrative charges be declared separately – i.e. not bundled
with the disability and survivors’ insurance premium – and exhorted providers
to cut back on marketing and advertising efforts (World Bank, 2005). Even this
has not been sufficient. To bring charges down, the government is now propos-
ing that each year all new entrants be allocated to the provider offering the low-
est charges and also committing itself to apply these to existing contributors
(Gobierno de Chile, 2006).
The new Nigerian system suffers many of the same weaknesses. Initially, there
were 13 open PFAs (as of 23 October 2007) competing for members and four
custodians competing to manage the assets the plans collect. There is a maxi-
mum charge levied on assets under management, but this is 3% – twice as high
as the destructively high 1.5% cited earlier and 10 times as high as the 0.3% at
which an efficient, privately-managed system of individual accounts ought to be
able to function (Pensions Commission, 2005). If the full charge were indeed
levied, this could reduce savings over a 30-year period by over 40%.19
Competition among the plans might drive charges below the 3% maxi-
mum, but this remains an aspiration. Each of the Nigerian PFAs engages in
advertising, and each has its own website. Some of these are highly sophisti-
cated and contain animated features. They compete on appearance. None
make mention of the charge that is to be levied. Certain of the PFAs have a
relatively privileged position. Inertia, together with its access to the records of
the NSITF, is likely to give Trustfund an advantage in enrolling private sec-
tor employees.20 However, if the experience of Chile is valid, it is likely that
few of the PFAs will survive, while the fewer PFAs there are, the lower the
likelihood that competition occurs and the higher the likelihood that savings
go not to finance old age but to support a new branch of the financial services
industry.
Furthermore, any failure of a PFA is likely to bring its own costs. At the very
least, the government might find itself obliged to pay minimum pensions to
members of schemes that have failed. In fact, political pressure is likely to require
intervention on a greater scale. In the early years of the reformed Chilean sys-
tem, a number of pension fund providers were obliged to cease operating. Four
of the largest PFAs came close to insolvency during the early 1980s and were res-
cued only by the government becoming, at least temporarily, the majority share-
holder. A fifth was taken over by a creditor bank (Mesa-Lago, 1989). It is clear
that, although the system was supposedly private, its survival depended upon
support from the state. The same could be said to hold for the new Nigerian sys-
tem. The government might be unable to allow it to fail.
Other costs to the state are those commonly referred to as ‘transition costs’.
Between half and three quarters of the value of the accounts of people retir-
ing in Chile in the first 20 years of the reform was made up of the Recognition
Bonds they had been awarded (Mesa-Lago, 1994). Redeeming these bonds
placed a burden upon public finances that had to be met by the issue of new
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debt or the renunciation of spending for other purposes. Transition costs are
unavoidable. There are opportunity costs to reforms of the type undertaken,
whether or not they are declared through recognition bonds or some equiva-
lent. Experience suggests that net costs are high in the initial decades follow-
ing reform, tail off only after some 25 years and become negative only after
some 40 years (Casey, 2004; Mesa-Lago, 2005).
In the case of Nigeria, the sole attempt at costing appears to be that carried
out by the IMF and the World Bank in late 2003. Over some unspecified
period, the new system for federal government employees will be only 10%
cheaper than the old system. However, the IMF admitted that even this might
be an overestimate, since it took no account of the contingent liabilities of the
minimum pension (IMF, 2005a).21 The ILO analysis of liabilities with respect
to private sector pensioners and those close to retirement suggested that these
might be as high as Niara 211bn – more than 5 times the value of the reserve
that the NSITF had built up to date (ILO, 2006).
THE IMPACT ON CAPITAL MARKETS AND GROWTH
It is frequently argued that establishing a funded pension scheme can con-
tribute to the development of capital markets and that the resulting accumu-
lation of savings will promote economic growth.22 The Nigerian government
certainly stressed this. Describing the ‘strategic implications’ of the reform, it
talked of ‘the new scheme’s potential to promote national savings’ and, by
implication, economic growth; of how funded pension schemes ‘have the
capacity to promote capital market development’; and of how ‘DC schemes
are believed to have the potential to generate positive economic externalities,
including the promotion of deeper, more competitive, and more liquid finan-
cial markets’ (PenCom, 2004).
The extent to which the Chilean reform has had a positive impact upon cap-
ital market development is disputed. Some have credited it with generating ‘a
financial deepening process that can be a decisive factor in order to develop a
domestic capital market’ (Haindl, cited in Matijascic and Kay, 2006: 12). The
IMF has repeated this position, suggesting that ‘[t]he new system has created
a significant demand for investment assets and has helped develop capital
markets’ (IMF, 2005b: para. 10). A more nuanced view is given by a recent
World Bank study. This concluded that ‘capital market development in Latin
America (and in Chile in particular) has been driven largely by regulations
imposed by the government on the pensions industry and other financial
institutions’ and that ‘the role of pension funds in the development of capital
markets in Latin American countries is largely determined by government
instructions that touch every aspect of their operations, from the amount of
contributions that the industry receives to the investment of pension assets’
(Yermo, 2004: 2–3).
Others have been more sceptical. They have argued that pension reform by
itself will not lead to improved capital markets since successful reforms also
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require regulatory changes, market liberalization, and the privatization of
state-owned industries (Matijascic and Kay, 2006) and that ‘it is only the com-
bination of pension reform, privatization of public utilities, and effective regu-
lation, against the background of very favorable macroeconomic conditions,
that can explain the rapid development of capital markets in Chile’ (Barrientos,
1998: 143, emphasis added).
The impact of funded pension systems on savings rates is also unclear. The
academic literature is, at best, agnostic. It is recognized that saving can take many
forms, one of which might substitute for another, and that increased savings by
one party might merely finance increased indebtedness by another (Holzmann
and Hinz, 2005; Orzag and Stiglitz, 2001). In the case of Chile, a substantial
increase in the national savings rate was observable in the years immediately fol-
lowing the 1981 reform. However, much of this could be attributed to the tight
fiscal policy, involving substantial budget surpluses, that was being pursued by
the government. Moreover, although a major increase in corporate savings was
also observed, this was attributed, as much as anything else, to a 1984 reform that
reduced tax rates on both undistributed and distributed profits (Yermo, 2004).
As important as the level of savings is the form that they take. Funded pen-
sion schemes are argued to contribute to the development of long-term sav-
ings and, so, to the availability of long-term finance for investors. Because
productive projects are less liquid, an increase in the availability of long-term
capital should, on average, increase the returns to be made on investing in
such projects (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). Even if pension schemes invest
solely in government bonds, they might have a positive impact in so far as they
stimulate the debt market. ‘They can create a demand for long-term rather
than short-term public debt, and this eventually helps to build the yield curve’
(Holzmann and Hinz, 2005: 113–14).
What is important is what actually happens. In the case of Chile, it is less
certain that the pension system was able to channel finance to industry.
Pension fund investment in equities has remained low, and Chilean PFAs own
only about 10% of the stock market. Strict investment regulations prevent
them from investing in equities that are not rated as investment grade. Yet the
companies that could issue such equity tend to have adequate, and often
cheaper, access to capital over the banking system, including access to finance
from abroad. Those companies that have the greatest need for capital are not
able to access pension savings and remain reliant on bank lending. In total,
and over 20 years after the reform, banks still supply over five times more cap-
ital to Chilean industry than PFAs. At the same time, the PFAs own some two
thirds of government debt (Yermo, 2004).
An assessment of whether the Nigerian pension reform is likely to con-
tribute to economic development requires an appraisal of the country’s finan-
cial infrastructure. The IMF concluded that, ‘[o]verall, [that infrastructure]
has not fostered stability or supported investment and economic develop-
ment’, and it deemed the financial environment to be one of ‘high risk’. As a
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consequence, banks were reluctant to supply loans to the real economy. The
Fund also pointed out that long-term bank lending was unavailable and that
the corporate bond market was inactive. Only larger, more established firms
had access to equity financing through the domestic stock exchange. The
banking system as a whole was ‘unsound’. The level of non-performing loans
was high and misreporting, systemic under-provisioning, widespread insider
lending, and illegal transactions were common. A heavy reliance on cash was
a sign of public mistrust of financial institutions (IMF, 2005d: para. 86).
The World Bank also saw Nigeria as lacking a financial sector that was
strong enough to support a multi-pillar pension system and advised against
reform of the sort that was being planned or undertaken. It described the
country’s financial sector as ‘characterized by high margins, low levels of
intermediation, and few financial products or services’ (World Bank, 2005:
Chapter 2).
A comparison of the Nigerian stock exchange with that of other countries
where funded pension systems are to be found underlines the concerns both
of the Fund and of the Bank. In 2004, the Nigerian stock exchange had a cap-
italization of little over 20% of GDP, compared to some 100% or more in the
Netherlands, the UK and the USA. In terms of liquidity, the Nigerian
exchange was even less important. The value of securities traded in that year
was under 2% of GDP, compared to 100% or more in the countries men-
tioned earlier. Volumes traded relative to capitalization were similarly low.
Moreover, stock market valuation refers to the value of all securities listed, not
only to the value of those of investment grade. Of the 200-plus quoted com-
panies, only some 60 have been rated at all. The number of instruments –
equities, bonds and government paper – that might be eligible for receipt of
investments by pension funds is reckoned to be no more than 40 or 45.23
The assets that are building up in the pension funds – currently at a rate of
some US$45m per month, but US$100m if the federal scheme was fully up and
running – are currently being invested in money market instruments. The fis-
cal surplus that is currently being run by the federal government means that
there is not even a sufficiency of treasury bills in which they could be invested.
Moreover, the price of domestic shares is currently being inflated by the short-
age of new issuances, since domestic companies that are of investment grade
have no need to raise additional capital. The shares of the multi-national oil
companies that are active in Nigeria are neither quoted on the Nigerian stock
exchange, nor are the shares of the recently privatized telecommunications
companies, since these companies were bought up by foreign operators. The
initial public offering of the one major company that was launched to manage
a further range of privatized operations was undersubscribed and its shares, in
any case, have not been deemed fit for pension fund investment.24
As a consequence, the regulator, PenCom, has had to take upon itself the
somewhat unexpected role of encouraging the development of appropriate
long-term financial instruments. It has pinned its hope on ‘infrastructural
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bonds’ that would finance improvements of communications and energy and,
thus, improve Nigeria’s productive potential. Exactly who would issue these
bonds is unclear. To be of investment grade, they would, effectively, have to
be backed by existing, rated domestic financial institutions. Since these have
neither the interest nor the skills to develop such products, PenCom is look-
ing for foreign advisors to assist it in realizing its aspirations.
It might be argued that the situation of Chile prior to the 1981 reform was
not dissimilar to that of Nigeria at the start of the millennium. It is true that
the Chilean stock market was small and illiquid. It grew partly as a result of a
large-scale privatization programme that did not merely involve buy-ups by
foreign companies, and in part as a result of a programme promoting eco-
nomic stability that encouraged investor confidence. How far either has been
achieved in Nigeria is uncertain. Pension reform alone will not create such
conditions. It did not do so in Chile. Rather, it is only if such conditions pre-
vail that pension reform in Nigeria has any chance of success.
Conclusions
Nigeria was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to introduce a pension sys-
tem based on individual, funded accounts. Two issues arise – whether the
infrastructure exits that permits the operation of such a system and, yet more
fundamentally, whether such a system is appropriate for the needs of a coun-
try like Nigeria. Both issues are addressed below.
GENERAL GOVERNANCE ISSUES
Clear regulations are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for good gover-
nance. An appropriate implementation and enforcement culture is also
required. However, Nigeria is known for its low scoring on measures of sound
administration. Even by 2005 there were only five countries placed lower than
Nigeria out of the 158 rated by Transparency International (http://www.trans-
parency.org). Equally, it was scarcely above the 6th percentile on the World
Bank Institute rating of countries with respect to ‘control of corruption’ and
‘rule of law’ and only in the 16th percentile with respect to ‘regulatory quality’
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance). Moreover, many Nigerian com-
mentators share the pessimistic views of external assessors (Oshionebe, 2004).
Any evaluation of the new pension system needs to take account of this.
Even a casual analysis of the composition of personnel in the emerging pen-
sion fund industry shows a high degree of overlap with other business inter-
ests. Thus, two of the four PFC directors had also been members of the
Vision 2010 committee. The first chairman of PenCom was appointed as the
managing director of Transcorp – the company founded to play a leading
role in the privatization of state-owned enterprises. The chairman of
Transcorp was the director general of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE),
258 Global Social Policy 8(2)
and in this function, she promoted Transcorp shares to potential stock buy-
ers (Abati, 2006; TMCnet, 2005). When the chairman of PenCom fell out
with the president and was dismissed, he was replaced by a former managing
director and chief executive of a bank that is the parent company of one of
the four approved PFCs. Moreover, the heads of the major regulatory insti-
tutions – the SEC and EFCC, as well as PenCom – are hand-picked by the
president who can also dismiss his appointees at any point.25 There is a pat-
tern of general lack of regulatory autonomy of Nigerian institutions
(Herskovits, 2007).
However, it also has to be asked why the current reform was undertaken at
all. A major push factor was that the old system was characterized by large-
scale non-payment. At least part of the failure to pay out promised pensions
in a timely fashion is attributable to the fact that almost all federal govern-
ment revenue comes from a single source – oil – the price of which is unsta-
ble, while the distribution of the revenues lies with the federal government
alone. Downturns in the oil price could significantly curtail income while
leaving obligations, including pension obligations, unchanged. This applied
as much to pensions owed to employees of the individual federal states, and
the local governments below these, as to the pensions owed to employees of
the federal government itself. The resources of lower levels of government
consisted primarily of their entitlement to a predetermined share of national
oil revenues. Moreover, the individual states and local governments have no
control over the salary levels, and so pension entitlements, of their employ-
ees – these were set federally (Adamu, 2005; Barkan et al., 2001). All of this
had been recognized in the Vision 2010 report, and it had led it to pronounce
that ‘[o]nly the rich [countries] can successfully operate an unfunded, non-
contributory pension scheme’ (Pension Subcommittee, 1997: 31).
The Vision 2010 committee had set the objective of most Nigerians having
access to a formal social security programme (Pension Subcommittee, 1997:
45), and it argued this could be achieved by establishing a funded pension sys-
tem backed by large-scale privatization. Yet this objective was not met by the
reform of 2004. The new system continues to exclude the poor and workers
in the informal sector. Furthermore, federal, state and local employees might
see the high deductions from their salaries for the funded pension system as
another tax and might resist the new system in various ways. Last, it is at least
questionable whether selling of state enterprises and issuing of shares to
absorb pension savings, together with the transfer of pension management to
private companies, will solve governance problems and uproot corruption.
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: SOCIAL PENSIONS
If neither the old nor the new pension system is appropriate, policy makers
might look at whether there are other ways to provide for older people in
countries such as Nigeria. One of these might be a social pension – a cash
transfer to old people in which eligibility is on residence and where financing
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comes not from contributions but from general tax revenue. The contribution
of social pensions to the objective of poverty relief in developing countries has
been long advanced by the ILO; more recently, it has been recognized by the
World Bank as well (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005; Palacios and Sluchynsky,
2006). Social pensions have been credited with positive developments in those
countries that have introduced them.
The Chilean government is about to introduce social pensions, termed
‘basic solidarity pensions’ (Gobierno de Chile, 2006). Currently, some 60% of
the elderly population receive a very low pension or depend on social assis-
tance (Arenas de Mesa and Mesa-Lago, 2006; Riesco, 2004). Its introduction
is an acknowledgement that, after 25 years, the system of funded pensions has
failed to address the pension needs of the majority of Chilean citizens.26
The costs for setting up a social pensions system has to be compared with
the costs of other social policies such as support for primary education or basic
health care. Some studies have suggested that social pensions have con-
tributed to improving women’s health, fighting rural poverty, heightening the
status of older people in the family and increasing school enrolment (Johnson
and Williamson, 2006). However, social pensions also have disadvantages. In
the Nigerian case, it is not merely that they might weaken traditional systems
of informal family care for the elderly (Johnson and Williamson, 2006). A
social pension would still be reliant upon the same revenue base as the old,
unfunded, pension scheme. It would be an alternative way of distributing gov-
ernment revenue, channelling it away from elites to broader swathes of the
population, but the instability of the revenue source, and thus the likelihood
of payments falling into arrears, would remain. Moreover, effective delivery
mechanisms would have to be in place. Determining eligibility for a social
pension has to be done on a decentralized basis, placing considerable powers
in the hands of local administrative structures – informal ones as much as for-
mal ones. The administrative capacity of state and local governments in
Nigeria has been frequently questioned. A recent survey of state governments
by the National Planning Agency found that, on a series of performance
benchmarks covering areas such as fiscal management, service delivery and
transparency, only 13 out of 36 states scored a minimum 25% (White, 2006).27
Nonetheless, a social pension system might be well-suited to address the
‘catch-22’ of a country such as Nigeria that needs to maintain a strong federal
centre based on centralized resource endowment but that lacks legitimacy.
Social pensions would distribute some of the oil wealth in an equal manner
between richer and poorer states. The federal government could gain addi-
tional legitimacy through a social pension system.
To sum up, Nigeria might have tried learning from Chile, but it learned
from the wrong book. Moreover, not only was that book wrong, it was also
becoming outdated. Tackling the problem of social security in old age
demands a different approach. Nigeria could learn useful lessons from abroad,
but it should learn the latest, not the dated, lessons from Chile.
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notes
1. Proximity, similarity and status are often suggested as potential sources of encour-
agement and facilitators of policy transfer (Weyland, 2004: Chapter 1).
2. At best the attitude of the Bank could be summed up in a comment it made in its
assessment of the history of pension reform in Latin America in the 20 and more
years since 1981, namely that the various ‘shortcomings [that were experienced],
if not a failure of the reform model, are indeed failings of the actual reforms under-
taken’ (Gill et al., 2005: 5).
3. The Managing Director of the IMF spoke of Vision 2010 at a conference,
‘Nigeria: The Way Forward’, in spring 1999, while the government outlined it in
its Letter of Intent to the Fund of mid-2000, wherein it described the policies it
intended to implement in the context of its request for financial support (see IMF,
1999, 2000).
4. In explaining how the reform nevertheless went ahead, the Bank referred to ‘incon-
sistency in [its] pension assistance [that] can also be attributed to the lack of specific
guidelines on how and when to support pension reform’. It went on to suggest that
‘turnover in Regional Bank leadership can exacerbate inconsistency and lack of con-
tinuity, especially as Country Assistance Strategy priorities change. Further, when
conflicts arise between the sector and country units, there is no agreed-upon method
of resolution’. Here, Nigeria is cited as a case in point (World Bank, 2005: 50).
5. These were workers within three years of retirement age and people who had
already retired.
6. Based on the authors’ calculations using the consolidated accounts of the federal
government produced by the IMF and data from the NSITF.
7. This can be calculated using data available from the NSITF website, see
http://www.nsitf.com
8. By 2004, that fund was worth rather under 0.5% of GDP.
9. A further business interest group, the Nigerian Insurers Association, made repre-
sentations to the committee, insisting that any legislation should include explicit
reference to life insurers as potential providers of pensions. This demand was met
by including into the law a provision allowing insurance companies to ‘split’ their
licenses and to operate in the pension sector as long as they form separate busi-
ness entities for this purpose (Alabadan, 2006).
10. There is also a representative of the Nigerian Union of Pensioners. The remaining
nine ordinary members of the board members represent federal government inter-
ests, the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
11. Personal communication from PenCom.
12. In Chile, the reform meant that there were no employer contributions at all, while
employees faced a substantial increase in contribution rates. This was supposed to
be compensated for by a one-off pay increase, mandated by government. At a time
of high inflation, how real the compensation was is questionable (Gruber, 1997).
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13. If called upon, these policies pay out a lump-sum payment equal to three years’
earnings.
14. It is unclear whether the minimum pension referred to is one for the individual
or whether all potential minimum pensions are meant.
15. With respect to pension rights accrued in an occupational scheme, these are to be
transferred to the PFA of the member’s choice unless the occupational scheme has
been able to transfer itself into a closed PFA.
16. In Chile, the custodian role was initially performed by the central bank and only sub-
sequently by private companies (Queisser, 1998). In Nigeria, banks and insurers were
given the opportunity from the start to set up companies that could serve as PFCs.
17. In Chile, the only example of social partnership involvement in the PFAs to be
found was with respect to two of the original 12 PFAs that were managed by
‘unions’ and professional associations (Mesa-Lago, 1994: 129).
18. Federal government bonds were the mainstay of NSITF investments in the past.
Such bonds were attractive in the sense that the nominal yield on them was high
– higher than those available from other recognized investment products.
However, if government bond yields remain high, it means that the government
has failed to meet its objective of monetary and fiscal stabilization, while if the
government does meet this objective, yields will have to fall.
19. This assumes an inflation rate of 5%, a nominal bond yield of 10.5%, a nominal
equity yield of 12.5% and a portfolio of 35% equities and 65% bonds.
20. The federal government also appeared to give an advantage to certain of the new
PFAs when the Ministry of Information and National Orientation issued a circu-
lar listing seven PFAs by name through which the civil servants could open their
accounts – this at a time when 13 had been approved (ThisDay, 3 February 2006).
21. The federal states and local government authorities will incur their own transi-
tion costs when they, too, reform their pension systems.
22. For the World Bank, this was a secondary objective; the primary objective was
consumption smoothing and the reduction of poverty (World Bank, 2005: 5). The
Nigerian government’s Vision 2010 report, by contrast, stated (Pension
Subcommittee, 1997: 16): ‘There are two important roles pension schemes play
in a modern economy. These are: (a) At micro level, it is a tool for human resource
management; (b) At macro level, it is an important device for mobilizing long-
term savings for the nation’s economic growth.’
23. Personal communication from PenCom.
24. The company, Transcorp, was supposed to act as a sort of South Korean chaebol,
pursing a leading role in the privatization of Nigerian enterprises. Its business
focus included national telecommunications, the oil and gas sector and ‘virtually
every major area of the economy’ (TMCnet, 2005).
25. For the legal right of the President to appoint and dismiss regulators, compare the
relevant legal documents regulating the appointment and dismissal of PenCom,
SEC and EFCC personnel (see http://www.nigeria-law.org; for the work of the
EFCC, see http://www.efccnigeria.org/index.php).
26. The reform also aims to address issues of gender equality by introducing unisex
annuity rates and contribution credits for child bearing. In addition, attempts are
made to expand coverage rates of the self-employed and of low-wage workers. For
a transitional period, these groups will receive subsidies for contributing to the
system.
27. Senior civil servants from Nigeria, in conversation with the authors, expressed a
strong preference for a pension system that was governed at the level of the
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Federation rather than at the state or local level, since the distribution capacity of
the Federation was seen to be higher (personal information, May 2006).
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résumé
Réforme de Pension pour le Nigéria: Comment pas ‘Apprenez
des Autres’
Tandis que la réforme de pension pour le Chili a reçu l’attention considérable, son imi-
tation n’en a pas pour le Nigéria. Cet article est la première analyse approfondie de la
réforme nigérienne. Il suggère que les autorités nigériennes n’ont pas appris les leçons
du Chili. Ils ont transféré un système qui n’a pas servi au pays dont on l’a copié et c’é-
tait inadéquat au pays auquel il a été copié. Pour des pays tels que le Nigéria, il faut
prendre les formes d’alternative des dispositions en prévision de la vieillesse. Ils pour-
raient considérer adopter une pension sociale.
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resumen
La Reforma de Pensiones en Nigeria: Como no se Debe
‘Aprender de los Otros’
Aunque la reforma de pensiones en Chile ha recibido mucha atención, no se puede
decir lo mismo respecto a su emulación en Nigeria. El presente documento es el
primer análisis que examina en profundidad la reforma en Nigeria. Indica que las
autoridades en Nigeria no han aprendido la lección de lo que pasó en Chile.
Transpusieron un sistema que falló de servir al país de donde fue copiado, y que no es
apropiado al pais que lo copió. Para los países como Nigeria, hay que buscar formas
alternativas de provisión para la vejez. Una pensión social podría ser una posibilidad.
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